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Abstract
Network virtualization has become increasingly prominent in recent years. It enables the creation of network
infrastructures that are specifically tailored to the needs of distinct network applications and supports the instantiation
of favorable environments for the development and evaluation of new architectures and protocols. Despite the wide
applicability of network virtualization, the shared use of routing devices and communication channels leads to a series
of security-related concerns. It is necessary to provide protection to virtual network infrastructures in order to enable
their use in real, large scale environments. In this paper, we present an overview of the state of the art concerning
virtual network security. We discuss the main challenges related to this kind of environment, some of the major
threats, as well as solutions proposed in the literature that aim to deal with different security aspects.
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1 Introduction
Virtualization is a well established concept, with applica-
tions spanning several areas of computing. This technique
enables the creation of multiple virtual platforms over
a single physical infrastructure, allowing heterogeneous
architectures to run on the same hardware. Additionally,
it may be used to optimize the usage of physical resources,
as an administrator is able to dynamically instantiate and
remove virtual nodes in order to satisfy varying levels of
demand.
In recent years, there has been a growing demand
for adaptive network services with increasingly distinct
requirements. Driven by such demands, and stimulated
by the successful employment of virtualization for hosting
custom-built servers, researchers have started to explore
the use of this technique in network infrastructures. Net-
work virtualization allows the creation of multiple inde-
pendent virtual network instances on top of a single
physical substrate [1]. This is made possible by instanti-
ating one or more virtual routers on physical devices and
establishing virtual links between these routers, forming
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topologies that are not limited by the structure of the
physical network.
In addition to the ability to create different topological
structures, virtual networks are also not bound by
other characteristics of the physical network, such as its
protocol stack. Thus, it is possible to instantiate virtual
network infrastructures that are specifically tailored to
the needs of different network applications [2]. These
features also enable the creation of virtual testbeds that
are similar to real infrastructures, a valuable asset for
evaluating newly developed architectures and protocols
without interfering with production traffic. [3] For these
reasons, network virtualization has attracted the interest
of a number of researchers worldwide, especially in the
context of Future Internet research. Network virtualiza-
tion has been embraced by the Industry as well. Major
Industry players – such as Cisco and Juniper – nowa-
days offer devices that support virtualization, and this new
functionality allowed infrastructure providers to offer new
services.
In contrast to the benefits brought by network virtu-
alization, the shared use of routing devices and commu-
nication channels introduces a series of security-related
concerns. Without adequate protection, users from a vir-
tual network might be able to access or even interfere with
traffic that belongs to other virtual networks, violating
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security properties such as confidentiality and integrity
[4,5]. Additionally, the infrastructure could be a target for
denial of service attacks, causing availability issues for vir-
tual networks instantiated on top of it [6,7]. Therefore, it
is of great importance that network virtualization archi-
tectures offer protection against these and other types of
threats that might compromise security.
Recently, attention has been drawn to security concerns
in network infrastructures due to the discovery of per-
vasive electronic surveillance around the globe. Although
all kinds of networks are potentially affected, the shared
use of physical resources in virtual network environments
exacerbates these concerns. As such, these recent circum-
stances highlight the need for a comprehensive analysis
of current developments in the area of virtual network
security.
In this paper, we characterize the current state of the art
regarding security in network virtualization. We identify
the main threats to network virtualization environments,
as well as efforts aiming to secure such environments.
For this study, an extensive literature search has been
conducted. Major publications from the literature have
been studied and grouped according to well known clas-
sifications in the area of network security, as well as
subcategories proposed by the authors of this paper. This
organization allows the analysis and discussion of multiple
aspects of virtual network security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a brief background on the area of
network virtualization as well as a review of related liter-
ature. Section 3 introduces the taxonomy used to classify
the selected publications. Section 4 exposes the security
vulnerabilities and threats found in the literature, while
Section 5 presents the security countermeasures provided
by solutions found in previous proposals. In Section 6, we
discuss the results of this study, and in Section 7 we sum-
marize the main current research challenges in the area of
virtual network security. Last, in Section 8 we present our
conclusions.
2 Background and literature review
In this section, we first provide a brief background on the
area of network virtualization, highlighting its most rel-
evant concepts. Next, we present a review of literature
closely related to virtual network security.
2.1 Background
Network virtualization consists of sharing resources from
physical network devices (routers, switches, etc.) among
different virtual networks. It allows the coexistence of
multiple, possibly heterogeneous networks, on top of a
single physical infrastructure. The basic elements of a net-
work virtualization environment are shown in Figure 1.
At the physical network level, a number of autonomous
systems are represented by interconnected network sub-
strates (e.g., substrates A, B, and C). Physical network
devices are represented by nodes supporting virtualiza-
tion technologies. Virtual network topologies (e.g., virtual
networks 1 and 2), in turn, are mapped to a subset of
nodes from one or more substrates. These topologies are
composed of virtual routers, which use a portion of the
resources available in physical ones, and virtual links,
which are mapped to physical paths composed of one
or more physical links and their respective intermediate
routers.
From the point of view of a virtual network, virtual
routers and links are seen as dedicated physical devices.
However, in practice, they share physical resources with
routers and links from other virtual networks. For this
reason, the virtualization technology used to create this
environment must provide an adequate level of isolation
in order to enable the use of network virtualization in real,
large scale environments.
Over the years, different methods for instantiating vir-
tual networks have been used. Typical approaches include
VLANs (Virtual Local Area Networks) and VPNs (Virtual
Private Networks). Recently, Virtual Machine Monitors
and programmable networks have been employed to cre-
ate virtual routers and links over physical devices and
communication channels. These approaches are briefly
revisited next.
2.1.1 Protocol-based approaches
Protocol-based approaches consist of implementing a net-
work protocol that enables the distinction of virtual net-
works through techniques such as tagging or tunneling.
The only requirement of this kind of approach is that
physical devices (or a subset of them) support the selected
protocol.
One example of protocol-based network virtualization
are VLANs. VLANs consist of logical partitions of a sin-
gle underlying network. Devices in a VLAN communicate
with each other as if they were on the same Local Area
Network, regardless of physical location or connectivity.
All frames sent through a network are tagged with their
corresponding VLAN ID, processed by VLAN-enabled
routers and forwarded as necessary [8]. Since isolation is
typically based only on packet tagging, this approach is
susceptible to eavesdropping attacks.
Another commonly used approach is the creation of
Virtual Private Networks. VPNs are typically used to
provide a secure communication channel between geo-
graphically distributed nodes. Cryptographic tunneling
protocols enable data confidentiality and user authentica-
tion, providing a higher level of security in comparison
with VLANs. VPNs can be provided in the physical, data
link, or network layers according to the protocols being
employed [9].
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Figure 1 Network virtualizationmodel, denoting a scenario with multiple physical substrates (Substrate A, B, and C) and virtual networks
(Virtual Network 1 and 2).
2.1.2 Machine virtualization-based approaches
Machine virtualization-based approaches consist of creat-
ing virtual networks bymeans of groups of interconnected
virtual machines. Virtual Machine Monitors are used to
instantiate virtual routers, and virtual links are established
between them, regardless of physical network topol-
ogy. Table 1 shows different machine virtualization-based
techniques that can be used to create virtual networks, as
well as a brief explanation and an example of each.
This alternative is remarkably flexible and relatively
cheap, as it allows the use of customized software and does
not require the use of specific hardware1. However, it is
more demanding in terms of resource usage in compar-
ison to previously described protocol-based approaches.
Additionally, it may introduce security concerns associ-
ated with server virtualization, some of which are men-
tioned in Sections 4 and 5. A general study on the security
issues that arise from the use of machine virtualization
was performed by van Cleeff et al. [10].
2.1.3 Programmable networks
Programmable routers have been used to enable the cre-
ation of virtual networks. Although this is not a new
concept, research in this area has been recently stimulated
by the inception of Software-Defined Networking (SDN).
This paradigm consists of decoupling the data plane and
the control plane in network devices. More specifically,
devices such as routers and links retain only the data
plane, and a separated control planemanages such devices
based on an overview of the entire network.
OpenFlow [11], one of the most promising techniques
for implementing this paradigm, defines a protocol that
allows a centralized controller to act as the control
plane, managing the behavior of network devices in
a dynamic manner. The controller communicates with
network devices through a secure connection, creating
and managing flow rules. Flow rules instruct network
devices on how to properly process and route network
traffics with distinct characteristics. Through the estab-
lishment of specific flow rules, it is possible to logically
partition physical networks and achieve data plane iso-
lation. This isolation enables the creation of virtual net-
works on top of an SDN environment. OpenFlow gave rise
to the Open Networking Foundation, an organization ran
bymajor companies within the area of computer networks
that aims to disseminate this type of technology.
Table 1 Virtualization techniques
Technique Description Examples
Full virtualization The Virtual Machine Monitor emulates a complete machine, based on the underlying
hardware architecture. The guest Operating System runs without any modification.
VMware Workstation,
VirtualBox
Paravirtualization The Virtual Machine monitor emulates a machine which is similar to the underlying
hardware, with the addition of a hypervisor. The hypervisor allows the guest Operating
System to run complex tasks directly on non-virtualized hardware. The guest OS must be
modified in order to take advantage of this feature.
VMware ESX, Xen
Container-based
virtualization
Instead of running a full Virtual Machine, this technique provides Operating System-level
containers, based on separate userspaces. In each container, the hardware, as well as the
Operating System and its kernel, are identical to the underlying ones.
OpenVZ, Linux VServer
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2.2 Literature review
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous
attempts at characterizing the state of the art regarding
security in network virtualization. However, there have
been a number of similar studies in other, closely related
fields of research. We now proceed to a review of some of
the main such studies.
Chowdhury et al. [1] provide a general survey in the
area of network virtualization. The authors analyze the
main projects in this area (both past projects and, at the
time of publication, current ones) and discuss a num-
ber of key directions for future research. The authors
touch upon the issues of security and privacy both while
reviewing projects and discussing open challenges; how-
ever, as this is not the main focus of this survey, there
is no in-depth analysis of security issues found in the
literature.
Bari et al. [12] present a survey that focuses on
data center network virtualization. Similarly to the
aforementioned study, the authors survey a number
of key projects and discuss potential directions for
future work. When analyzing such projects, the authors
provide insights on the fault-tolerance capabilities of
each one, in addition to a brief discussion on security
issues as one of the potential opportunities for future
research.
In addition to the general studies on network vir-
tualization presented so far, a number of surveys on
cloud computing security have also been carried out.
Cloud computing environments tend to make use of both
machine and network virtualization, making this a highly
relevant related topic for our study. However, while there
is some overlap between cloud computing security and
virtual network security, we emphasize that cloud com-
puting represents a very specific use case of network
virtualization and, therefore, poses a significantly dis-
tinct set of security challenges. Zhou et al. [13] provide
an investigation on security and privacy issues of cloud
computing system providers. Additionally, the authors
highlight a number of government acts that originally
intended to uphold privacy rights but fail to do so in light
of advances in technology. Hashizume et al. [14], in turn,
focus on security vulnerabilities, threats, and countermea-
sures found in the literature and the relationships among
them.
Last, Scott-Hayward et al. [15] conducted a study
on SDN security. As explained in Section 2.1.3, this
is one of the technologies on top of which network
virtualization environments can be instantiated. The
authors first analyze security issues associated with the
SDN paradigm and, afterwards, investigate approaches
aiming at enhancing SDN security. Last, the authors
discuss security challenges associated with the SDN
model.
3 Taxonomy
The first step towards a comprehensive analysis of the
literature was the selection of a number of publications
from quality conferences and journals. To this end, we
performed extensive searches in the ACM and IEEE dig-
ital libraries using a number of keywords related to net-
work virtualization and security. We then ranked the
literature found through this process according to the
average ratio of citations per publication of the con-
ferences or journals in which these papers were pub-
lished. All publications from top tier conferences or
journals with a consistent number of citations per publi-
cation were considered relevant and, therefore, selected.
The remaining papers were analyzed and generally
discarded.
Following the aforementioned process, a taxonomy was
created in order to aid the organization and discussion
of the selected publications. For this purpose, two well
known classifications in the area of network security were
chosen. Papers are organized according to the security
threats they aim to mitigate, and afterwards, according
to the security countermeasures they provide. As different
authors have different definitions for each of these con-
cepts, these classifications are briefly explained in the fol-
lowing subsections. The direct connection between them
and the area of virtual network security is explained in
sections 4 and 5, respectively.
In addition to these broad classifications, subcategories
were created in order better organize this body of work.
Figure 2 presents the full hierarchical organization that
will be used in sections 4 and 5. Dark gray boxes repre-
sent broad categories used in the literature [16,17], while
white boxes denote subdivisions proposed and created by
the authors of this paper.
3.1 Security vulnerabilities and threats
There are a number of potential malicious actions, or
threats, that may violate security constraints of compu-
tational systems. Shirey [16] describes and divides the
consequences of these threats into four categories, namely
disclosure, deception, disruption, and usurpation.
Unauthorized disclosure is defined as gaining unau-
thorized access to protected information. Sensitive data
may be erroneously exposed to unauthorized entities, or
acquired by an attacker that circumvents the system’s
security provisions.
Deception is characterized by intentionally attempting
to mislead other entities. For example, a malicious entity
may send false or incorrect information to others, leading
them to believe that this information is correct. Fake iden-
tities may be used in order to incriminate others or gain
illegitimate access.
Disruption means causing failure or degradation of
systems, negatively affecting the services they provide.
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Figure 2 Taxonomy used to classify publications in the area of virtual network security.
This may be done by directly incapacitating a system
component or the channel through which information is
delivered, or by inducing the system to deliver corrupted
information.
Last, through usurpation, an attacker may gain unau-
thorized control over a system. This unauthorized control
may allow the attacker to illegitimately access protected
data or services, or tamper with the system itself in order
to cause incorrect or malicious behavior.
These threat categories, as well as the previously men-
tioned subcategories we have created, also cover vul-
nerabilities and attacks. For ease of comprehension,
vulnerabilities and threats are discussed collectively in
Section 4. Table 2 presents the relationships between vul-
nerabilities and threats in network virtualization environ-
ments. This table is organized according to the previously
described taxonomy and lists all vulnerabilities found in
the literature and the threats associated with each one.
Additionally, the terms threat and attack are used inter-
changeably throughout the paper, as a threat may be
understood as a potential attack (while an attack is the
proper action that takes advantage of a vulnerability to
violate a security policy).
3.2 Security countermeasures
Due to the existence of the previously described threats,
computational systems must provide a series of coun-
termeasures in order to maintain a desirable level of
security. Stallings [17] categorizes these essential counter-
measures into six subdivisions (referred to by Stallings as
“security services”), namely access control, authentication,
data confidentiality, data integrity, nonrepudiation, and
availability.
Access control allows a system to administer which enti-
ties will be able to access its functions, and what permis-
sions each of these entities will have. In order to grant
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Table 2 Relationships between vulnerabilities and threats in network virtualization environments
Threat categories Vulnerabilities Threats
Disclosure
Information Leakage
Lack of ARP table protection ARP table poisoning
Placement of firewall rules inside virtual nodes Subversion of firewall rules
Information Interception
Lack of ARP table protection ARP table poisoning
Transmission of data in predictable patterns Traffic Analysis attacks
Uncontrolled handling of multiple, sequential virtual
network requests from a single entity
Inference and disclosure of sensitive topological
information
Unprotected exchange of routing information
among virtual routers
Disclosure of sensitive routing information
Introspection Exploitation Uncontrolled Introspection Data theft
Deception
Improper handling of identities: Injection of malicious messages with forged
Identity Fraud - within individual networks; sources
- among federated networks; Privilege escalation
- during migration procedures. Abuse of node removal and re-addition
in order to obtain new (clean) identities
Loss of registry entries Uncontrolled rollback operations Loss of registry entries
Replay attacks Lack of unique message identifiers Replay attacks
Disruption
Physical Resource
Uncontrolled resource allocation
Performance degradation
Overloading
Abusive resource consumption
Uncontrolled handling of virtual network Exhaustion of resources in specific parts
requests of the infrastructure
Lack of proactive or reactive recovery
Denial of Service attacksstrategies
Physical Resource Failure
Lack of proactive or reactive recovery
Failure of virtual routers/networksstrategies
Uncontrolled resource reallocation after Overloading of remaining virtual routers
failures after failures
Usurpation
Identity Fraud Improper handling of identities and associated
privileges
Privilege escalation
Software Vulnerability Privilege escalation in Virtual Machine Unauthorized control of physical routers
Exploitation Monitors
individual access rights and permissions, entities must be
properly authenticated in the system.
The purpose of authentication is to ensure that entities
communicating with each other are, in fact, the entities
they claim to be. The receiver of a message must be able
to correctly identify its sender, and an entity must not be
able to impersonate another.
Providing adequate data confidentialitymeans ensuring
that third parties do not have access to confidential infor-
mation being transmitted between two entities. Addition-
ally, the system should inhibit attackers from deriving
information by analyzing traffic flow characteristics.
Data integrity has the purpose of assuring that data
stored by entities or transmitted through a network
are not corrupted, adulterated or destroyed. Attacks
such as duplication, modification, reordering, and replay
of messages must be prevented. Furthermore, mecha-
nisms for recovering from data corruption may also be
provided.
In communications between peers, nonrepudiation pro-
vides a way to settle disputes when an entity denies having
performed a certain action. The goal of this service is to
prevent entities from falsely denying participation in any
(possibly malicious) network-related activity.
The last security countermeasure is availability. System
resourcesmust be available upon request by an authorized
entity, and the system must also conform to its perfor-
mance specifications. In order to maintain availability,
countermeasures against attacks such as denial of service
must be provided.
4 Security vulnerabilities and threats
In this section, we present a comprehensive list of vulner-
abilities and threats found in network virtualization envi-
ronments. The interested reader should refer to Table 2
for a systematic review of such vulnerabilities and threats.
While some of the threats listed in this section are
a result of accidental actions, we emphasize that all
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threats – intentional or accidental – have an effect on
security. As an example of an accidental attack, it is com-
mon for virtual routers to attempt to use all available
resources (as virtualization tends to be transparent and
virtual routers are typically not aware that they are not
running on dedicated physical hardware). If the network
virtualization environment does not adequately limit the
resource usage of each virtual router, even this unin-
tentional abuse may cause disruption on other networks
hosted on the same substrate or cause the degradation or
failure of critical services provided by the virtualization
environment.
4.1 Disclosure
In an environment where physical resources are shared
between a number of virtual networks, there is a series
of behaviors that may result in undesired disclosure of
information. Threats related to disclosure of private or
sensitive information are explained next.
4.1.1 Information leakage
Cavalcanti et al. [18] mention the possibility of messages
being leaked from one virtual network to another. In this
type of attack, an entity may disclose private or sensitive
information to members of other virtual networks, who
should not have access to such information. The authors
state that this may be achieved through ARP table poi-
soning. For example, a malicious user may spoof the IP
address of a node that is able to send messages to the
virtual network with which it intends to communicate.
Wolinsky et al. [19] describe a similar attack, in which vir-
tual nodes send messages to outside the boundaries of a
network virtualization environment. This would make it
possible formessages to reach physical nodes that not only
do not belong to any virtual network, but are hosted out-
side of the virtualized network infrastructure. According
to the authors, if data isolation is achieved by means of
firewall rules, malicious users may be able to subvert such
rules by escalating privileges and gaining root access on a
virtual node.
4.1.2 Information interception
Attackers in a virtual network environment may capture
messages being exchanged between two entities in order
to access their content. This type of attack, often referred
to as “eavesdropping” or “sniffing”, may lead to theft of
confidential information [4,5,20]. Wu et al. [20], specifi-
cally, mention ARP table poisoning as a means of achiev-
ing this. In contrast to the ARP poisoning attack described
by Cavalcanti et al. [18] (explained in Section 4.1.1), in
this case the attack would be used in order to mislead
physical routers into forwarding packets meant to one
entity to another one, allowing a malicious entity to sniff
such packets. This is a common threat in any networking
environment, but the use of shared physical resources by
multiple virtual networks further exacerbates this prob-
lem. According to these and other authors, such as Cui
et al. [21], networking solutions provided by virtual
machinemonitorsmay not properly isolate data belonging
to different virtual networks. This means that members
of one virtual network may be able to access data being
transferred by other virtual networks sharing the same
substrate.
Even if data inside network packets is protected (e.g.
through the use of cryptography), entities may be able
to derive sensitive information by analyzing them. In
traffic analysis attacks, described by Huang et al. [22],
entities acquire such information by analyzing charac-
teristics of traffic flows between communicating entities
in virtual networks. These characteristics include which
entities communicate with which other entities, frequency
of communication, and packet sizes, among others. For
example, an entity that is involved in frequent, short com-
munications with a high number of other entities may be
a central point of control in the network. Knowing this,
a malicious user could launch an attack directed at that
entity, aiming to cause a considerable amount of disrup-
tion with limited effort. As previously mentioned, this
attack is effective even if traffic is encrypted, making any
type of virtual networking environment a potential target.
In addition to the previously detailed forms of informa-
tion interception, which may also affect traditional net-
work environments, other forms are specific to network
virtualization. One such form is the use of multiple virtual
network requests to disclose the topology of the physical
infrastructure, explored by Pignolet et al. [23]. This con-
stitutes a security threat, as infrastructure providers typi-
cally do not wish to disclose this information. The authors
demonstrate that by sequentially requesting a number
of virtual networks with varying topological characteris-
tics and analyzing the response given by the infrastruc-
ture provider (i.e., whether the request can be embedded
or not), they are able to gradually obtain information
about the physical topology. Moreover, the authors deter-
mine the number of requests needed to fully disclose the
physical topology on networks with different topological
structures (tree, cactus, and arbitrary graphs). Conversely,
Fukushima et al. [24] state that the entity controlling a
physical network may obtain confidential routing infor-
mation from virtual networks hosted on top of it. As
current routing algorithms require routing information
to be sent and received through virtual routers, sensitive
information may be disclosed to the underlying network.
4.1.3 Introspection exploitation
Introspection is a feature present in virtual machinemoni-
tors that allows system administrators to verify the current
state of virtual machines in real time. It enables external
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observers to inspect data stored in different parts of the
virtual machine (including processor registers, disk, and
memory) without interfering with it. While this feature
has valuable, legitimate uses (e.g., enabling administrators
to verify that a virtual machine is operating correctly),
it may be misused or exploited by attackers in order to
access (and potentially disclose) sensitive data inside vir-
tual machines [10]. This problem is aggravated by the fact
that virtual nodes may be moved or copied between mul-
tiple virtual machine monitors, as sensitive data may be
compromised through the exploitation of this feature on
any virtual machine monitor permanently or temporarily
hosting such virtual nodes.
4.2 Deception
We have identified three subcategories of threats that
may lead to deception in virtual network environments.
These subdivisions – namely identity fraud, loss of reg-
istry entries and replay attacks – are explained next.
4.2.1 Identity fraud
In addition to dealing with unauthorized disclosure,
Cabuk et al. [5] and Wu et al. [20] also describe threats
related to deception in virtual network environments.
Specifically, virtual entities may inject malicious messages
into a virtual network, and deceive others into believing
that such messages came from another entity.
Certain characteristics of virtualized network environ-
ments increase the difficulty of handling identity fraud.
The aggregation of different virtual networks into one
compound network, known as federation, is indicated by
Chowdhury et al. [25] as one of such characteristics. Fed-
eration raises issues such as the presence of separate roles
and possible incompatibility between security provisions
or policies from aggregated networks. Another compli-
cating factor mentioned by the authors is the dynamic
addition and removal of entities. An attacker may force a
malicious node to be removed and re-added in order to
obtain a new identity.
Other characteristics that complicate the handling of
identity fraud involve operations such as migration and
duplication of virtual nodes, as mentioned by van Cleeff
et al. [10]. The study presented by the authors refers to
virtualization environments in general. Therefore, in the
context of this study, a virtual node may refer to either a
virtual router or a virtual workstation. If a virtual node is
migrated from one physical point to another, the identity
of the machine that contains this virtual nodemay change.
Moreover, virtual nodes may be copied to one or more
physical points in order to provide redundancy, which
may lead tomultiple entities sharing a single identity. Both
of these issues may cause inconsistencies in the process
of properly identifying the origin of network messages,
which may be exploited in identity fraud attacks.
4.2.2 Loss of registry entries
Van Cleeff et al. [10] also mention issues related to log-
ging of operations in virtualization environments. If infor-
mation regarding which entity was responsible for each
operation in the network is stored in logs inside virtual
machines, entries may be lost during rollback procedures.
Likewise, logs of malicious activities performed by attack-
ers may also be lost.
4.2.3 Replay attacks
Fernandes and Duarte [26] mention replay attacks as
another form of deception in virtual networks. In this
type of attack, a malicious entity captures legitimate pack-
ets being transfered through the network and retransmits
them, leading other entities to believe that a message
was sent multiple times. The authors explain that virtual
routers may launch attacks in which they repeat old con-
trol messages with the intention of corrupting the data
plane of the attacked domain.
4.3 Disruption
In a network virtualization environment, proper manage-
ment of resources is crucial to avoid disruption. The main
sources of disruption in such environments are related
to the abuse of physical resources (either intentional or
unintentional) and the failure of physical devices.
4.3.1 Physical resource overloading
Physical resource overloading may lead to failure of vir-
tual nodes, or cause the network performance to degrade
below its minimum requirements. This degradation may
cause congestion and packet loss in virtual networks, as
stated by Zhang et al. [27]. In addition to causing disrup-
tion in already established networks, overloading may also
hinder the deployment of new ones.
Resource requirements themselves can be a point of
conflict in virtual network environments. As explained
by Marquezan et al. [28], multiple virtual networks may
require an excessive amount of resources in the same area
of the substrate network. While such prohibitive demands
may be unintentional, they may also be due to a coordi-
nated attack. This may not only happen during deploy-
ment operations, but also during the lifetime of virtual
networks.
It is also possible for one virtual network to disrupt
another by using more than its fair share of resources.
This concern is explored by a number of authors in their
respective publications [26,29-31]. Isolation and fair dis-
tribution of physical resources among virtual networks are
essential to maintain the network virtualization environ-
ment operating properly. This includes assuring that the
minimum requirements of each network will be fulfilled,
as well as prohibiting networks from consuming more
resources than they are allowed to.
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Overloading may also be caused by attacks aimed at
the physical network infrastructure. Attacks may originate
from within a virtual network hosted in the same environ-
ment, or from outside sources. The most common threats
are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as presented by Yu
et al. [6] and Oliveira et al. [7]. A single physical router or
link compromised by a DoS attack may cause disruption
on several virtual networks currently using its resources.
4.3.2 Physical resource failure
As previously stated, the failure of physical devices is
one of the sources of disruption in virtual infrastructures
[32-34]. Possible causes range from the failure of single
devices (a physical router, for example, may become inop-
erative if one of its components malfunctions) to natural
disasters that damage several routers or links in one or
more locations [35]. Additionally, further complications
may arise as the remainder of the network may be over-
loaded during attempts to relocate lost virtual resources.
In addition to being valuable from the point of view of
fault tolerance, countermeasures for mitigating the effect
of failures may also be applied in the event of attacks such
as DoS, as in both cases there is a need for redirecting
network resources away from compromised routers or links.
4.4 Usurpation
In virtual network environments, usurpation attacks may
allow an attacker to gain access to privileged information
on virtual routers, or to sensitive data stored in them.
Such attacks may be a consequence of identity fraud or
exploited vulnerabilities, which are explained next.
4.4.1 Identity fraud
As previously mentioned in Section 4.2, identity fraud
attacks can be used to impersonate other entities within a
virtual network. By impersonating entities with high levels
of privilege in the network, attackers may be able to per-
form usurpation attacks. As an example, the injection of
messages with fake sources mentioned by Cabuk et al. [5]
is used for this purpose. By sending amessage that appears
to have been originated from a privileged entity, attackers
may perform actions restricted to such entities, including
elevating their own privilege level.
4.4.2 Software vulnerability exploitation
Roschke et al. [36] mention that virtual machine mon-
itors are susceptible to the exploit of vulnerabilities in
their implementation. According to the authors, by gain-
ing control over a virtual machine monitor, attackers can
break out of the virtual machine, obtaining access to the
hardware layer. In an environment that uses full virtual-
ization or paravirtualization to instantiate virtual routers,
exploiting such vulnerabilities may enable an attacker to
have full control over physical routers. By gaining access
to physical devices, attackers could easily compromise any
virtual networks provided by the infrastructure. As exam-
ples of such threats in practice, the Common Vulnerabili-
ties and Exposures system lists a number of vulnerabilities
in different versions of VMware products that allow guest
Operating System users to potentially execute arbitrary
code on the host Operating System [37-40].
5 Security countermeasures
In this section, we explore solutions published in the
literature that aim to provide security and protect the
environment from the aforementioned security threats.
5.1 Access control
Access control makes use of authentication and authoriza-
tion mechanisms in order to verify the identity of network
entities and enforce distinct privilege levels for each. This
countermeasure is approached in two different manners
in the literature, namely Trusted Virtual Domains and
sandboxes. While these approaches are closely related to
the notion of controlled execution domains, note that
access control is performed in order to ensure that entities
are granted the appropriate privilege levels.
5.1.1 Trusted virtual domains
Cabuk et al. [5] devised a framework to provide secure
networking between groups of virtual machines. Their
security goals include providing isolation, confidential-
ity, integrity, and information flow control in these
networks. The framework provides the aforementioned
security countermeasures through the use of Trusted Vir-
tual Domains (TVDs). Each TVD represents an isolated
domain, composed of “virtualization elements” and com-
munication channels between such elements. In Cabuk’s
proposal, the virtualization elements are virtual worksta-
tions. However, the concept of TVDs may be applied to
any device supporting virtualization.
Figure 3 depicts a virtual network infrastructure with
three TVDs (A, B, and C). Gray routers represent gate-
ways between these domains. While the gateway between
TVDs B and C is simultaneously within both domains, the
gateways between A and B are isolated – making use of an
auxiliary TVD (AB) in order to communicate.
Figure 3 Example of a virtual infrastructure with three Trusted
Virtual Domains, as described by Cabuk et al. [5].
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Access control is performed when virtual machines join
a TVD, ensuring that only machines that satisfy a given
set of conditions are able to join. This admission control
may be applied continuously in case prerequisites to join
a TVD are changed. Additionally, TVDs leverage access
policies to prevent unauthorized access.
5.1.2 Sandboxes
Wolinsky et al. [19] use virtual machine sandboxes in
order to provide security in large scale collaborative envi-
ronments. Although this work focuses on networked vir-
tual machines hosting virtual workstations, this concept
can be extended to virtual networks. Sandboxes are used
to limit virtual machine access to physical resources, pre-
venting malicious virtual machines from accessing data
within other virtual machines. Moreover, each virtual
machine supports IPSec, enabling the creation of secure
communication channels, and X.509, providing virtual
machine authentication. The authentication process is
detailed in Section 5.2.
5.2 Authentication
Authentication aims to ensure that entities in a network
environment are who they claim to be. In virtual network
environments, providing proper authentication is com-
plicated by factors such as the federation of virtual net-
works or mobility of virtual routers and links. Approaches
that aim to deal with such difficulties are explained
next.
5.2.1 Interoperability between federated virtual networks
Although isolation is one of the main security require-
ments in virtual networking, there are cases in which
distinct virtual networks must be able to cooperate. The
federation of virtual networks can, for example, enable
end-to-end connectivity – through virtual devices of distinct
virtual networks – or allow access to distinct services.
However, it may not be possible to provide interoperabil-
ity due to the heterogeneous nature of virtual networks
(which may implement different, incompatible protocols).
Chowdhury et al. [25] partially tackle this issue with a
framework that manages identities in this kind of environ-
ment. Themain objective of the work is to provide a global
identification system. To this end, the authors employ a
decentralized approach in which controllers and adapters
are placed in each virtual network. Controllers provide
functionalities such as address allocation and name reso-
lution, while adapters act as gateways between virtual net-
works, performing address and protocol translations. The
proposed global identification system does not restrict the
internal identification mechanisms used locally by virtual
networks, allowing each virtual network to keep its own
internal naming scheme. Additionally, global identifiers
used by this framework are unique, immutable, and not
associated with physical location, in order to not hinder
the security or mobility of virtual devices.
5.2.2 Certificate-based
As previously mentioned, the framework presented by
Cabuk et al. [5] makes use of Trusted Virtual Domains
(TVDs) to provide access control and network isolation.
The authentication necessary to support access control
is provided by means of digital certificates. These certifi-
cates ensure the identity of entities joining the network.
Additionally, the system makes use of Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs) to authenticate entities in network commu-
nications.
Analogously, Wolinsky et al. [19] use IPSec with X.509-
based authentication for the purpose of access control
in their system. In order to access the system, joining
machines must request a certificate to the Certification
Authority (CA). The CA responds by sending back a
signed certificate to the node. The IP address of the
requesting node is embedded into the certificate in order
to prevent other nodes from reusing it.
5.2.3 Key-based
Fernandes and Duarte [26,31] present an architecture
that aims to provide efficient routing, proper resource
isolation and a secure communication channel between
routers and the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) in
a physical router. In order to ensure efficiency, virtual
routers copy routing-related information to the VMM –
in this case, the hypervisor. This process is performed
by a plane separation module, which separates the data
plane (which contains routing rules) and the control plane
(responsible for creating routing rules). As a result, pack-
ets matching rules in the hypervisor routing table do not
need to be redirected to virtual routers, resulting in a sig-
nificant performance speedup. However, the process of
copying routing information needs to be authenticated
such that a malicious router is not able to compromise the
data plane of another router.
In order to prevent identity fraud, the system requires
mutual authentication between virtual routers and the
VMM. Figure 4 depicts a simplified representation of
the proposed architecture. The authors consider a Xen
(paravirtualization)-based environment, in which virtual
routers reside in unprivileged domains (DomUs) while
the hypervisor resides within the privileged domain
(Dom0). Each virtual router, upon instantiation, connects
to the hypervisor following the client–server paradigm
and performs an initial exchange of session keys using
asymmetrical cryptography. The use of unique keys allows
the hypervisor to verify the identity of distinct virtual
routers in different unprivileged domains (in this exam-
ple, DomU1, DomU2, and DomU3) and to isolate traffic
between them. After this initial key exchange, the secure
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Figure 4 Simplified version of the architecture presented by
Fernandes et al. [26,31], showing the secure communication
modules.
communication module is used by other system mod-
ules in order to securely exchange messages with the
hypervisor.
5.3 Data confidentiality
As network virtualization promotes the sharing of net-
work devices and links among multiple entities, data
confidentiality is a major security-related concern. Next,
we explore approaches that leverage different protocols
and techniques in order to provide secure communication
within virtual networks.
5.3.1 VLANs and VPNs
The security goals approached by Cabuk et al. [5] include
integrity, data isolation, confidentiality, and information
flow control. Other than integrity, the remaining three
goals, are directly related, and are tackled by a data confi-
dentiality mechanism. The framework uses TVDs to con-
trol data access. However, virtual machines that belong
to different TVDs may be hosted in the same physical
machine. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure proper isola-
tion, preventing a TVD from accessing data that belongs
to another TVD.
The proposed solution for this challenge employs a
combination of VLANs and VPNs. VLANs are used to
identify packets belonging to different networks, allowing
VLAN-enabled devices to route packets to the appropriate
network interfaces, thus providing adequate isolation.
Untrusted physical channels, however, may require a
higher level of security. Therefore, if necessary, VPNs are
used to provide data confidentiality by means of end-to-
end cryptography.
5.3.2 Tunneling and cryptography
Wolinsky et al. [19] make use of tunneling in order to
isolate network traffic between virtual machines (in this
case, virtual workstations). Two tunneling approaches are
employed. In the first approach, the host system runs a
tunneling software that captures packets incoming from
physical interfaces and forwards them to virtual machines.
In the second approach, the tunneling software runs inside
virtual machines, and traffic is restricted within virtual
networks through the use of firewall rules. According to
the authors, while the second approach is easier to deploy,
malicious users may be able to subvert this firewall, com-
promising the system. Although the focus of Wolinsky
et al. is isolation between virtual workstations, we believe
that the techniques used to achieve such isolation could
be extended to virtual routers in network virtualization
environments.
Fernandes and Duarte [26,31] deal with data confiden-
tiality in communications between a virtual router and
the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) hosting it. After the
authentication process, described in Section 5.2, virtual
routers use symmetrical cryptography in order to securely
communicate with the VMM.
Huang et al. [22] present a framework that provides
secure routing. In the environment presented by the
authors, routing information that is propagated through a
virtual network is confidential and needs to be kept secret
from unauthorized network entities. Routing information
is categorized in groups, and group keys are assigned
to virtual routers. Therefore, routing information can be
encrypted, ensuring that only routers with the correct key
are able to decrypt this information. Thus, routing infor-
mation relative to a given group is protected against unau-
thorized access from other groups, other virtual networks
or the physical network itself.
Similarly to the previously described approach,
Fukushima et al. [24] aim to protect sensitive routing
information in virtual networks from being disclosed to
entities controlling the physical network. To achieve this
goal, the authors make use of a strategy based on Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC). SMC allows multiple
entities to perform joint computations on sensitive data
they hold without disclosing such data. Each entity has
access to the result of the global computation, but not to
any data held by other entities. This is achieved through
the use of one-way functions, which are easy to evalu-
ate but hard to invert. In the context of virtual network
routing, SMC allows a virtual router to compute optimal
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routes without needing to share the information that it
holds. As SMC requires full-mesh connectivity between
computing nodes, the authors decompose the virtual
network into locally connected subsets of routers, called
cliques. The SMC-based distributed routing algorithm
is run locally in each clique, and the results of local
computations are then shared between cliques.
As the employment of cryptographic techniques
requires physical devices that are capable of support-
ing protocols that enable them and generates process-
ing and bandwidth overheads, Bays et al. [4] devise an
optimization model and a heuristic algorithm for online,
privacy-oriented virtual network embedding. Clients may
require end-to-end or point-to-point cryptography for
their networks, as well as requiring that none of their
resources overlap with other specific virtual networks.
Both the optimal and heuristic approaches take into
account whether physical routers are capable of sup-
porting cryptographic algorithms in order to ensure the
desired level of confidentiality and guarantee the non-
overlapping of resources (if requested). Additionally, both
methods feature precise modeling of overhead costs of
security mechanisms in order to not underestimate the
capacity requirements of virtual network requests. This
proposal is in line with research performed in the area of
virtual network embedding, such as the work of Alkmim
et al. [41].
5.3.3 Firewalling and subnetting
As previously mentioned in Section 5.3.2, Wolinsky et al.
[19] make use of firewall rules (in addition to tunneling
techniques) in order to prevent communications between
different virtual networks. In addition to using firewalls
for this purpose, Wu et al. [20] also employ subnetting
(i.e., each virtual network is bound to a unique subnet)
in order to provide an additional layer of security against
unauthorized information disclosure.
5.3.4 Path splitting
In addition to encryption of routing information, Huang
et al. [22] use variable paths in virtual networks to prop-
agate data flows. Figure 5 illustrates the employment of
path splitting in order to hinder an information inter-
ception attack. Communication between a virtual router
hosted on Physical Router (PR) 1 and another one hosted
on PR 7 is split among two different paths – one passing
through PR 3 and 6, and the other, through PR 2 and 4
(represented by dashed lines). Even if traffic between these
two virtual routers is not encrypted, the threat is partially
mitigated as the attacker only has access to part of the
information being exchanged (packets passing through
the link between PR 3 and 6). Moreover, when used in
combination with encryption (as in the work of Huang
et al.), this approach helps mitigate traffic analysis attacks.
Figure 5 Example of path splitting used to mitigate an
information interception attack.
It is worth noting that while in this example the attacker is
only eavesdropping on one physical path, in reality, mul-
tiple devices may be compromised. In this case, splitting
traffic among an increasing number of paths would lead
to progressively higher levels of security (or, conversely, to
increasingly higher costs for an attacker to capture the full
traffic).
5.3.5 Limiting introspection
Finally, van Cleeff et al. [10] present recommendations
for safer use of virtualization. One of these recommenda-
tions is to limit, or even disable, the introspection feature,
which allows virtual machine monitors to access data
inside virtual machines. While useful, this functionality
may be exploited by attackers, as previously explained on
Subsection 4.1.3.
5.4 Data integrity
Similarly to confidentiality, data integrity is a major con-
cern as a result of shared network devices and commu-
nication channels. Next, we describe approaches that aim
to establish a desired level of integrity in virtual network
environments.
5.4.1 Cryptography
In addition to authentication (i.e., source integrity) and
confidentiality, the framework developed by Cabuk et al.
[5] makes use of VPNs to provide data integrity to virtual
networks. The use of cryptographic tunneling protocols
prevents malicious entities from manipulating messages
going through the network. As previously discussed, the
authors use IPSec as the tunneling protocol.
5.4.2 Timestamping
As previously discussed, replay attacks are one of the
threats to data integrity that may be present in net-
work virtualization environments. The addition of unique
identifiers inside encrypted messages makes it possi-
ble to detect duplicated messages, and therefore, replay
attacks. For this purpose, the architecture proposed by
Fernandes and Duarte [26,31] inserts timestamps inside
encrypted messages in order to ensure that messages are
non-reproducible.
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5.4.3 Limiting introspection
Besides mitigating information theft, disabling or limit-
ing introspection also prevents data tampering. Accord-
ing to van Cleeff et al. [10], this functionality allows
the VMM to modify applications running inside it,
which may cause inconsistencies. Another recommenda-
tion consists of specifically designing applications that
facilitate batch processing and checkpointing. According
to the authors, this minimizes security issues associated
with rollback and restore operations that may otherwise
threaten integrity.
5.5 Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation provides evidences regarding which
(potentially malicious) actions have been performed by
which entities. This security countermeasure is highly
valuable in the context of network virtualization environ-
ments, in which a number of physical devices are shared
by different users. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any
publication that targets this countermeasure specifically.
5.6 Availability
Last, we present proposals that aim to maintain the avail-
ability of network virtualization environments. The key
concerns in this area of security are providing proper
resource isolation andmitigating attacks that target physi-
cal or virtual devices. Approaches aiming to deal with such
concerns are explained in the following subsections.
5.6.1 Physical resource isolation
One of the main concerns regarding availability is the
abuse of physical resources by virtual networks. Virtual
networks may attempt to use as much resources as pos-
sible in order to maximize their performance. If the envi-
ronment is not adequately protected, this behavior may
lead to the exhaustion of physical resources, compromis-
ing the availability of other virtual networks hosted on
the same substrate. Therefore, physical resources must be
shared in a fair manner, and actions performed by a virtual
network must not negatively impact others.
According to Wu et al. [29], the sharing of physical
resources by packet processors is usually only performed
at a granularity of entire processor cores. The authors
claim that finer-grained processor sharing is required
in order to provide scalability for network virtualization
environments. Thus, the authors propose a system that
allows multiple threads to share processor cores con-
currently while maintaining isolation and fair resource
sharing. However, typical multithreading approaches con-
sider a cooperative environment, which is not the case in
network virtualization. The authors devise a fair multi-
threading mechanism that allows the assignment of differ-
ent priorities to each thread. Additionally, this mechanism
takes into account the history of howmuch processing has
been performed by each thread. Inactivity times are also
considered in order to guarantee that threads will not stay
idle for too long. The evaluation performed by the authors
shows that the proposed mechanism is able to properly
distribute processing resources according to the defined
priorities. Furthermore, while it requires more processing
power, it is able to provide better resource utilization in
comparison to coarse-grained approaches.
Kokku et al. [30] propose a network virtualization
scheme that provides resource isolation while aiming to
maximize substrate utilization. It allows virtual networks
to have either resource-based reservations (i.e., reserva-
tions calculated as a percentage of available resources
in the substrate) or bandwidth-based reservations (i.e.,
reservations based on the aggregate throughput of the vir-
tual network). Virtual networks are divided in two groups
according to the type of reservation required, and treated
independently by a scheduler. This scheduler treats flows
that belong to different virtual networks with distinct pri-
orities, based on the reservations and average resource
usage rate of each network. The authors present an eval-
uation performed on an implemented prototype, showing
that the proposed scheme was capable of ensuring that
each virtual network met its reservations.
Fernandes and Duarte [26] present a network monitor
that employs plane separation in order to provide resource
isolation in network virtualization environments. The sys-
tem is able to allocate resources based on fixed reserva-
tions, as well as to redistribute idle resources between
virtual networks that have a higher demand. Additionally,
an administrator is able to control the amount of resources
to be used by each virtual network, as well as set priorities
for using idle resources. The system continuously moni-
tors the consumption of physical resources by each virtual
router. If any virtual router exceeds its allowed use of
bandwidth, processing power, or memory, it is adequately
punished by having packets dropped, or a percentage of
its stored routes erased. Harsher punishments are insti-
tuted if there are no idle resources available. Conversely,
given punishments are gradually reduced if the router
stops using more than its allocated resources. This sys-
tem is capable of adequately preventing physical resources
from being overloaded, and packet drops employed by the
punishment mechanism do not cause a major impact on
network traffic.
In another publication [31], the same authors extend
the previously described network monitor. This new sys-
tem introduces the idea of short term and long term
requirements, based on the time frame in which they
must be met. Short term requirements may be allocated
in an exclusive or non-exclusive manner, while long term
requirements are always non-exclusive. In this context,
exclusive requirements are always allocated (even if part
of the allocated resources is idle), while non-exclusive
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requirements are only allocated when necessary. The sys-
tem prioritizes virtual networks that have used the lowest
portion of their requirements, and an adaptive control
scheme is used in order to improve the probability that
long term requirements, if needed, will be met. The pre-
sented evaluation shows the improvement of this system
over the original [26] in terms of guaranteeing that the
demands of each virtual network will be met, as well as
reducing resource load on the physical substrate.
5.6.2 Virtual network resilience
Even with proper physical resource isolation, maintaining
availability remains a challenge in virtualized networks.
The virtualization layer must be resilient, maintaining its
performance and mitigating attacks in order to sustain
its availability. Some of the publications described next
approach the issue of virtual network resilience from the
point of view of fault tolerance. Nonetheless, we empha-
size that the solutions described in these publications may
also be used as a response to attacks that cause the failure
or degradation of physical devices or links.
The solution presented by Yeow et al. [32] aims to pro-
vide network infrastructures that are resilient to physical
router failures. This objective is achieved through the use
of backups (i.e., redundant routers and links). However,
redundant resources remain idle, reducing the utilization
of the physical substrate. To minimize this problem, the
authors propose a scheme that dynamically creates and
manages shared backup resources. This mechanism min-
imizes the number of necessary backup instances needed
to achieve a certain level of reliability. While backup
resources are shared, each physical router is restricted to
hosting a maximum number of backup instances in order
not to sacrifice reliability. The connectivity between each
virtual router and its neighbors is preserved in all of its
backups, both in terms of number of links and bandwidth
reservations.
The illustration on the left side of Figure 6 shows a
simple representation of how backup nodes (represented
as circles) may be shared among different virtual net-
works. For example, the two backup nodes at the right
side of this figure are shared between Virtual Network 1
and Virtual Network 3, regardless of whether they belong
to one or the other. The right side of Figure 6, in turn,
depicts in greater detail how backups are allocated to vir-
tual routers. A virtual router C1 has virtual routers B1 and
B2 as its backups. Since C1 has a virtual link connect-
ing it to another router, N1, a virtual link with the same
bandwidth reservation (depicted as 1 in the figure) is also
established between each backup node and N1 in order to
preserve the connectivity of the original router.
Meixner et al. [35] devise a probabilistic model for
providing virtual networks that are resilient to physical
disasters. Disasters are characterized by the occurrence of
multiple failures in the physical network, as well as the
possibility of correlated cascading failures during attempts
to recover network resources. The virtual link mapping
strategy guarantees that the failure of a single physical
link will not disconnect any virtual network, and aims
at minimizing virtual network disconnection in the event
of a disaster (i.e., simultaneous failure of multiple links).
Additionally, excess processing capacity in the physical
network is used to create a backup router for each vir-
tual network, which reduces disconnection in the event of
disasters and provides additional processing capacity for
the recovery phase. When attempting to recover virtual
network resources, the model analyzes all possible virtual
router replacements in an effort to replace affected vir-
tual routers in a way that ensures the virtual network will
not be disconnected by any post-disaster failures.
The system presented by Zhang et al. [27] uses redun-
dant virtual networks in order to provide reliable live
streaming services. It is able to detect path failures and
traffic congestion, dynamically redirecting data flows.
Figure 6 Examples of sharing andmapping of backup instances, used by Yeow et al. [32] to provide resilient virtual networks.
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Initially, the data flow is distributed equally through avail-
able virtual networks. Figure 7 depicts the distribution of
a data flow through virtual networks, using multiple paths
between a server and a client. Gradually, the number of
packets routed through each virtual network is adapted
according to its relative bandwidth capacity. Additionally,
an active probing mechanism is used to detect failures
in the physical network or routing problems (changes in
routing tables, for example, may have a significant impact
in live streaming applications). If an issue is detected, the
system is able to redirect data flows away from problem-
atic networks and redistribute it among the remaining
ones. Experiments performed by the authors demonstrate
advantages in using multiple networks instead of a single
one, with increasing gains when using up to four vir-
tual networks. Additionally, the authors claim that the
bandwidth cost of the probing mechanism is negligible.
Chen et al. [33] propose a virtual network embedding
strategy that aims at ensuring survivability. Load balanc-
ing is employed in the embedding process in order to
balance the bandwidth consumption of substrate links.
Moreover, backup links are reserved for each accepted
virtual network, but not activated until a failure occurs.
Backup links are allocated in physical paths that do not
overlap with the path hosting the original link, guarantee-
ing that a single physical link failure will not simultane-
ously affect the original virtual link and one or more of its
backups. These backup resources may be shared by multi-
ple virtual networks or reconfigured over time in order to
improve efficiency.
Zhang et al. [34] devise a strategy for computing the
availability of Virtual Data Centers (VDCs), as well as an
algorithm for reliable VDC embedding. In order to deter-
mine VDC availability, the authors consider the availabil-
ity of individual, heterogeneous components, as well as
dependencies among them. The embedding mechanism
aims at meeting minimum availability criteria while opti-
mizing resource usage. Virtual devices are divided into
replication groups (groups in which any virtual devicemay
serve as a backup if another fails). In order to minimize
resource consumption, VDCs are embedded on physical
devices with the lowest level of availability that still meets
the desired level. In a similar way, a minimum number of
backups is assigned to each replication group in order to
meet availability requirements.
Unlike the previously described approaches in the area
of virtual network resilience, Oliveira et al. [7] present a
strategy based on “opportunistic resilience”, which does
not employ backup resources. The bandwidth demand of
each virtual link is split over multiple physical paths. As a
consequence, physical link failures are less likely to cause
a virtual link disconnection (an affected virtual link will
remain operational, albeit with less capacity). Addition-
ally, when link failures occur, a reactive strategy is used in
order to reallocate the lost capacity over unaffected paths,
attempting to fully restore the bandwidth of degraded
virtual links.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a com-
mon threat to the availability of network services. The
system proposed by Yu and Zhou [6] aims to detect
such attacks on community networks (federated vir-
tual networks that belong to cooperating entities). The
devised solution leverages communication between vir-
tual routers that belong to different entities in this collab-
orative environment to detect possible attacks at an early
stage. Virtual routers located on the edges of the commu-
nity network monitor traffic passing through them and
calculate the entropy of its flows. Traffic surges in any of
these flows will cause the entropy to drop, indicating a
possible attack. If this occurs, other routers are notified
Figure 7 A live streaming data flow is distributed among different virtual networks, a mechanism used by Zhang et al. [27].
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and instructed to calculate the entropy rate of this sus-
pected flow. Calculated values are compared, and if they
are similar, a DDoS attack is confirmed.
6 Discussion
A number of insights can be obtained from the extensive
investigation of the state of the art reported in this paper.
First, it is possible to observe that the publications in the
area are not equally distributed between the main security
categories. Tables 3 and 4 show, respectively, the secu-
rity threats and security countermeasures approached in
these publications. In both tables, publications have been
grouped together according to the security elements they
approach, whenever possible. It is noticeable that disrup-
tion and availability – a security threat and a counter-
measure that are directly correlated – are approached in
the majority of these publications. This is likely due to
the high prevalence of attacks aiming at causing disrup-
tion. These attacks are relatively simple but can be highly
Table 3 Security threats mentioned in publications in the
area of virtual network security
Publication
Threats
DI DE DR US
[4] ×
[19] ×
[21] ×
[22] ×
[23] ×
[24] ×
[10] × ×
[20] × ×
[5] × × ×
[25] ×
[26] × ×
[36] ×
[6] ×
[7] ×
[27] ×
[28] ×
[29] ×
[30] ×
[31] ×
[32] ×
[33] ×
[34] ×
[35] ×
From left to right: Disclosure, Deception, Disruption, Usurpation.
Table 4 Security countermeasures provided by
publications in the area of virtual network security
Publication
Countermeasures
AC AU CO IN NR AV
[4] ×
[20] ×
[22] ×
[24] ×
[19] × × ×
[5] × × × ×
[26] × × × ×
[31] × × × ×
[10] × ×
[25] ×
[6] ×
[7] ×
[27] ×
[29] ×
[30] ×
[32] ×
[33] ×
[34] ×
[35] ×
From left to right: Access Control, Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity,
Nonrepudiation, Availability.
devastating, especially in an environment that makes
heavy use of shared resources (as a single physical fail-
ure may disrupt several virtual networks). Disclosure and
confidentiality follow closely behind, being present in a
similar number of publications as disruption/availability.
Once again, this is linked to physical resource sharing.
Similarly to disruption attacks, such sharing means that
a single well-placed sniffer may be able to acquire sensi-
tive information from multiple virtual networks at once.
Moreover, there are also privacy concerns between infras-
tructure providers and virtual network requesters (as the
former may have access to data that the latter considers
confidential).
Second, only a small number of publications approach
more than one threat or countermeasure simultaneously.
No single publication has dealt with threats in more
than two of the four categories, or presented solutions
that provide more than four security countermeasures,
out of a total of six. Additionally, one security coun-
termeasure in particular – nonrepudiation – was not
approached by any of the publications. The combination
of authentication and integrity, which exists in some pub-
lications, can be considered as the basis for the provision
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of nonrepudiation, but this specific countermeasure is
not targeted. Nonrepudiation is a highly valuable (albeit
challenging) security countermeasure for network virtu-
alization environments, and will be further discussed in
Section 7.
Third, we were able to conclude that many of the threats
that affect network virtualization environments also affect
traditional networks. However, we emphasize that these
threats affect traditional and virtual network environ-
ments in different ways. In most cases, the effects of these
threats are greatly exacerbated by certain characteristics
of virtual network environments. Information intercep-
tion, physical resource overloading, physical resource fail-
ure, and software vulnerability exploitation are aggravated
by the fact that a number of virtual routers may share
a physical router. Therefore, as previously explained, an
attack of any of these types targeting a single physical
router may affect several virtual networks. Further, it is
more difficult to recognize (and, therefore, to perform
countermeasures against) identity fraud and replay attacks
due to the dynamicity of network virtualization environ-
ments, as virtual routers may be freely moved among
physical routers and assume different identities. Loss of
registry entries and information leakage, as described in
the studied literature, are limited to virtual network envi-
ronments. Moreover, threats related to introspection are
also inherent to these types of environments, as this is a
(potentially exploitable) feature of virtual machine moni-
tors.
Last, we can observe the employment of different vir-
tualization techniques in some publications. For exam-
ple, Cabuk et al. [5] implemented a prototype of their
framework based on a paravirtualization platform, while
Huang et al. [22] consider an underlying network based
on programmable routers. Further, Fernandes and Duarte
[26,31] build a hybrid solution that combines par-
avirtualization with plane separation, a core idea of
programmable networks. Although the majority of pub-
lications do not target specific network virtualization
techniques, we emphasize that different types of plat-
forms have their own sets of benefits, as well as security
concerns, which need to be taken into account.
7 Challenges
Despite the existence of a sizable body of work in virtual
network security, some challenges remain open. In this
section, we summarize some of the main research chal-
lenges in this area. We emphasize, however, that these
challenges should not be considered exhaustive, but rather
as a starting point for further discussions in the area.
One clear opportunity for research in virtual net-
work security is the provisioning of nonrepudiation –
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been
approached. Nonrepudiation requires providing proof of
actions performed by entities on a network, which can
be used for holding entities accountable for malicious
activity. We deem nonrepudiation an essential security
countermeasure for virtual networking environments in
order to accurately backtrace attacks – not only to ensure
that punitive actions will be taken against the attackers
but also to properly contain the attacks themselves. In the
event of a DDoS attack, for example, this countermeasure
could enable administrators to pinpoint the origins of the
attack with a high level of precision – which otherwise
tends to be a very difficult task. Moreover, nonrepudia-
tion may even prevent attacks, in the sense that malicious
users who are aware that such a mechanism is in use
may refrain from carrying out attacks in order to avoid
exposing themselves. Provisioning nonrepudiation can be
challenging for a number of reasons, such as the complex-
ity of securely storing and handling digital certificates –
used for proving that an action was, indeed, performed by
a given entity – and the negative impact this has on net-
work performance. Moreover, it is necessary to maintain
a desired level of privacy for virtual network requesters
as well as end users. Nevertheless, we envision that the
importance of this countermeasure will grow steadily as
network virtualization becomes increasingly prominent in
production environments.
In addition to privacy issues related to nonrepudia-
tion, there are also concerns regarding the privacy of
general data stored in virtual routers or sent through
virtual networks. Although such data may be protected
from being intercepted by other entities, infrastructure
providers have physical access to all data stored in virtual
networks they are hosting. Although this issue has been
approached by some authors, their proposed strategies are
often based on strong assumptions, such as the ability to
choose which physical entity (out of a number of enti-
ties controlling the physical substrate) will host each of its
routers – a feature that may not commonly be available in
practice.
Another opportunity stems from the multiple levels of
heterogeneity present in network infrastructures. As pre-
viouslymentioned, in addition to the use of heterogeneous
hardware devices, it is common for network substrates
to be composed of a number of physical networks that
belong to different entities. As such, there is a need for
uniform methods for requesting, negotiating, and enforc-
ing security requirements across devices that may have
incompatible interfaces and entities with potentially con-
flicting policies.
Last, software platforms used to instantiate virtual
networks may not always offer adequate protection
against security threats. Moreover, although virtualiza-
tion technologies are gradually evolving and becoming
more mature, both hardware and software are suscepti-
ble to vulnerabilities that may be exploited by attackers.
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Consequently, research efforts that build on top of net-
work virtualization need to consider these security issues
and, most importantly, overhead costs of additional secu-
rity mechanisms that may be necessary, in order to ensure
that they will be suitable for real world environments.
We emphasize, once again, that this is not an exhaustive
list of challenges in the area. The essence of network vir-
tualization is based on layers upon layers with increasing
levels of abstraction (e.g., the physical substrate, the virtu-
alization layer, virtual networks, and services running on
top of them). Consequently, we envision that a number of
other challenges may be present in all of these layers –
much like the ones listed in this section.
8 Conclusions
Network virtualization enables the subdivision of a single
network infrastructure into multiple virtual architectures.
The benefits of this technique apply to a wide range of
applications, including the creation of virtual testbeds,
community networks, and cloud computing infrastruc-
tures. Furthermore, network virtualization has been pro-
posed by researchers as the basis for the creation of a new
architecture for the Internet, allowing pluralist network
environments that support a number of different network
protocols simultaneously.
In spite of the benefits provided by network virtualiza-
tion, there is a series of security issues that need to be con-
sidered. Our study revealed a number of security threats,
covering the four categories defined by Shirey [16]. The
very act of sharing a physical infrastructure among mul-
tiple parties is shown to be the source of several of these
threats.
This study shows that there have been several efforts
to provide security in virtual networks. However, these
efforts were not organized in a comprehensible manner.
This study provides a systematic overview of the avail-
able research results in the field, categorizing work that
represents the state of the art and highlighting different
approaches for providing security. Additionally, it also evi-
dences imbalances between different sub-areas of security
research in network virtualization, which can be used as
guidance for future work in this area. Usurpation and
access control, for example, are significantly underrep-
resented in relation to other security countermeasures,
and nonrepudiation is not targeted by any publication.
Additionally, while a significant body of work exists in
the sub-area of availability, only one publication deals
with detection and prevention of attacks. Such gaps may
represent valuable opportunities for future work.
To summarize, the categorization of security threats
and countermeasures presented in this paper simplifies
the analysis of which security aspects have not yet been
approached and which types of threats need to be miti-
gated. Furthermore, it makes it easier to identify a number
of existing solutions that aim to provide security in virtual
networks.
Endnotes
1Machine virtualization is available for personal
computers, in commonly used operating systems (e.g.,
Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X).
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